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California Supreme Court Survey
May 1997 - August 1997
The California Supreme Court Survey provides a brief synopsis of recent
decisions by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inform the reader of issues that the supreme court has addressed, as well as to serve as a starting point for researching any of the topical areas.Attorney discipline,judicial
misconduct, and death penalty appeal cases have been omittedfrom the survey.
The survey will review California Supreme Court cases in a summary format. Summaries provide the facts, holdings and brief outlines of the areas of
law addressed in California Supreme Court cases. Additionally, summaries
include references to additional research sources. Summaries are designed to
provide the readerwith a basic understandingof the legal implications of cases
in a conciseformat.

SUMMARIES

I. Arbitration/Workers' Compensation
When a party to a judicial arbitration subsequently
elects a trial de novo, California Labor Code section
3856(b) entitles the electing party to recover reasonable litigation expenses and attorney's fees from the
judgment before it is subject to a claim for reimbursement of worker's compensation benefits, despite California Code of Civil Procedure section
1141.21(a)(ii), which requires that the party electing
,a trial de novo, who receives a less favorable judgment, pay the costs incurred by the opposing party
without recovering his own litigation expenses.
Phelps v. Stostad, Supreme Court of California,Decided
July 21, 1997, 16 Cal. 4th 23, 939 P.2d 760, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 360 .................................
689

II. Criminal Law
A.

Although a minor defendant's statements to a probation officer in preparation for a juvenile court fitness hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 707(c) may not be used substantively at a
subsequent criminal trial to prove guilt, such statements are admissible to impeach the minor
defendant's trial testimony.
People v. Macias, Supreme Court of California, Decided
Aug. 26, 1997, 16 Cal. 4th 739, 941 P.2d 838, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 659.................................
693

B.

An accomplice who aids and abets a robbery only
after the principal, acting alone, commits a killing
during the robbery is not guilty of first degree murder under Penal Code section 189. A trial court's
failure to instruct the jury on that principle is not
reversible error, however, where other parts of the
verdict demonstrate that the jury necessarily found
the defendant guilty of first degree murder on a
proper theory.
People v. Pulido, Supreme Court of California,Decided
May 29, 1997, 15 Cal. 4th 713, 936 P.2d 1235, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 625.................................
699

C.

Where a picture of victims at a crime scene is sought
to be introduced at trial, the photograph may be
relevant to corroborate witness testimony, to show
premeditation of a crime, and, under a felony-murder
theory, to show that a murder occurred. Further,
where the photograph is not overly gruesome, it will
likely not be considered unduly prejudicial.
People v. Scheid, Supreme Court of California, Decided
July 17, 1997, 16 Cal. 4th 1, 939 P.2d 748, 65 Cal. Rptr.
2d 348. .......................................
704
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III. Healing Arts and Institutions
The statutory "reasonable licensee defense" set
forth in section 1424 of the Health and Safety Code
does not negate or repeal the common law doctrine
of nondelegable duties for licensees, and allows longterm health care facility licensees that have received
citations for violations of patient care laws to rebut
a presumption of negligence by showing that both
the licensee and its agents acted reasonably under
the circumstances.
California Ass'n of Health Facilities v. Department of
Health Servs., Supreme Court of California,Decided Aug.
7, 1997, 16 Cal. 4th 284, 940 P.2d 323, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d
872 . .........................................
709
IV. Juror Misconduct
When a juror is unable to render a verdict upon the
evidence presented, and instead reaches a verdict
based on extraneous information, which creates a
state of mind rendering a juror unable to act with
entire impartiality and without prejudice, the juror
has failed to act as a competent juror under California law, and, therefore, a new trial for the defendant
must be granted.
People v. Nesler, Supreme Court of California, Decided
August 21, 1997, 16 Cal. 4th 561, 941 P.2d 87, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 454.................................
713

V.

Statute of Limitations
When a plaintiff, suing for medical malpractice under
the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act, serves
a defendant with the required ninety day notice of
intent to sue prior to the expiration of the original

three year statute of limitations, the notice serves to
toll the original statute of limitations for ninety
days.
Russell v. Stanford University Hospital, Supreme Court
of California,Decided June 5, 1997, 15 Cal. 4th 783, 937
P.2d 640, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97. ....................
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I. Arbitration/Worker's Compensation
When a party to a judicial arbitration subsequently elects a trial de novo, California Labor Code
section 3856(b) entitles the electing party to recover reasonable litigation expenses and
attorney's fees from the judgment before it is subject to a claim for reimbursement of worker's compensation benefits, despite California Code of
Civil Procedure section 1141.21(a)(ii), which requires that the party electing a trial de novo, who
receives a less favorable judgment, pay the costs
incurred by the opposing party without recovering
his own litigation expenses.
Phelps v. Stostad, Supreme Court of California,Decided July 21, 1997, 16 Cal. 4th 23, 939 P.2d 760, 65
Cal. Rptr. 2d 360.
Facts. The plaintiff was injured when a vehicle driven by the defendant
crashed into the building where the plaintiff was working. The plaintiff
filed an action against the defendant to recover damages for his injuries,
and his employer intervened to recover the cost of worker's compensation benefits paid to the plaintiff. In a judicial arbitration proceeding, the
plaintiff was awarded $45,000 and his employer was awarded the entire
cost of the plaintiffs compensation benefits. Pursuant to California Code
of Civil Procedure section 1141.20(b), the plaintiff rejected the award and
elected a trial de novo in the superior court. Prior to trial, the plaintiffs
employer assigned its right to reimbursement for its worker's compensation expenditures to the defendant in exchange for $20,000.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court awarded the plaintiff $7100 in
economic damages, and $7500 in general damages. The defendant filed a
memorandum seeking costs of $6,933.02, as well as a motion requesting

that $28,000 be set off against the judgment to reflect the amount of
compensation benefits paid to the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed that,
pursuant to California Labor Code section 3856(b), he was entitled to
have his litigation costs and attorney's fees (totaling more than $18,000)
paid from the judgment before it was subject to reduction for payment of
worker's compensation benefits.

The trial court ruled that Civil Procedure Code section ll41.21(a)(ii)
precluded the recovery of litigation expenses and attorney's fees under
Labor Code section 3856(b) because the plaintiff elected a trial de novo
and received a judgment less favorable than the original arbitration
award. Pursuant to this ruling, the court offset the plaintiffs award of
$7100 for economic damages by the $28,000 cost of compensation benefits, and reduced the plaintiffs $7500 award for general damages by the
defendant's costs of $6933.02, leaving the plaintiff with an award of
$566.98. The plaintiff appealed and the court of appeal affirmed the trial
court's judgment.
Holding. The California Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal and
remanded the case back to the trial court. The court held that even when
a party who elects a trial. de novo subsequent to judicial arbitration is
precluded from recovering his costs under Civil Procedure Code section
1141.21(a)(ii), the judgment is still subject to allocation pursuant to Labor Code section 3856(b), including payment of reasonable litigation
expenses and attorney's fees. The court reasoned that the two statutes
do not conflict because they apply to different relationships. Civil Procedure Code section 1141.21(a)(ii) controls the allocation of costs between
adverse parties, while Labor Code section 3856 controls the distribution
of a judgment between an injured employee and his employer.
The court stated that the legislature enacted Civil Procedure Code
section 1141.21 to encourage parties to accept reasonable arbitration
awards. This purpose is accomplished by requiring that the party electing
a trial de novo, who receives a less favorable award, to pay the costs
incurred by the opposing party, and by precluding him from recovering
his own costs.
In contrast, the court indicated that the legislature enacted Labor Code
section 3856 as part of California's comprehensive worker's compensation system, one purpose of which is to relieve workers from any costs
associated with injuries sustained in the course of their employment.
Section 3856 accomplishes this purpose, in part, by providing that the
injured employee may recover his reasonable litigation expenses and
attorney's fees from a judgment, prior to any set-off for worker's compensation benefits already paid to the employee. The court noted that
this rule was enacted specifically for situations like the present case,
where the amount of a judgment is insufficient to cover both the
employee's litigation expenses as well as the employer's worker's compensation payment.
The court then stated that a party does not "recover his or her costs",
as the term is used in Civil Procedure Code section 1141.21(a)(ii), when
a portion of the party's judgment is used to pay his litigation expenses or
attorney's fees. The court indicated that to interpret the statute in the
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same manner as the court of appeal would lead to undesirable results.
For example, the plaintiff electing a trial de novo and receiving a less
favorable judgment would not only have to pay the costs of the opposing
party without being able to recover his own litigation expenses, but
would also be precluded from using his judgment to pay litigation costs
or attorney's fees. The court concluded that die legislature did not intend
this result.
REFERENCES
Statutes:
CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1141.10 (Deering 1981 & Supp. 1998) (requiring

arbitration of civil claims for less than $50,000).
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1141.21 (Deering 1981 & Supp. 1998) (providing

for recovery of costs resulting from a trial de novo).
CAL. LAB. CODE § 3856 (Deering 1991 & Supp. 1998) (providing for allocation of payments from a judgment for damages).
Legal Texts:
6 CAL. JUR. 3D Arbitration and Awards §§ 119-121 (1988 & Supp. 1996)
(discussing a plaintiffs right to a trial de novo subsequent to judicial
arbitration).
6 CAL. JuR. 3D Arbitration and Awards § 123 (1988 & Supp. 1996) (discussing the recovery of costs by a defendant following a trial de novo).
2 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Worker's Compensation § 73
(9th ed. 1987) (discussing the procedures for apportionment of attorney's
fees).
6 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Proceedings Without Trial § 579
(4th ed. 1997 & Supp. 1997) (discussing the allocation of costs and fees
from a trial de novo).

Law Review and Journal Articles:
Sharon A. Jennings, Court-Annexed Arbitration and Settlement Pressure: A Push Towards Efficient Dispute Resolution or "Second Class"
Justice, 6 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 313 (1991) (discussing compulsory
judicial arbitration).
Joseph H. King, The Exclusiveness of an Employee's Worker's Compensation Remedy Against His Employer, 55 TENN. L. REV. 405 (1988) (discussing recovery under workers compensation systems).
Daoud A. Awad, Note, On Behalf of MandatoryArbitration, 57 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1039 (1984) (discussing judicial arbitration and provisions for a trial
de novo).
Philip D. Oliver, Comment, Once is Enough: A Proposed Bar of the Injured Employee's Cause of Action Against a 3rd Party, 58 FORDHAM L.
REV. 117 (1989) (proposing that employees be prohibited from suing third
parties in tort to recover additional damages beyond those provided by
worker's compensation).
Nancy Reynolds, Note, Why We Should Abolish Penalty Provisionsfor
Compulsory Nonbinding Alternative Dispute Resolution, 7 OHIO ST. J.
ON DisP. RESOL. 173 (1991) (discussing three forms of compulsory nonbinding alternative dispute resolution).

JOHN W. CORRINGTON
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II.

Criminal Law
A.

Although a minor defendant's statements to a
probation officer in preparation for a juvenile
court fitness hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(c) may not be used substantively at a subsequent criminal trial to
prove guilt, such statements are admissible to
impeach the minor defendant's trial testimony.
People v. Macias, Supreme Court of California, Decided Aug. 26, 1997, 16 Cal. 4th 739, 941 P.2d 838,
66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 659.

Facts. In 1992, a sixteen-year-old juvenile defendant participated in a
failed attempt to smuggle individuals from Mexico into the United States.
During a high-speed chase with immigration officials, the defendant
caused an accident resulting in the death of six persons. Seeking to have
the minor tried as an adult for operating a motor vehicle without a license and to try him for six counts of murder, the prosecutor petitioned
the juvenile court for a fitness hearing under California Welfare and Institutions Code sections 707(c)' to determine whether the defendant was
fit to be tried as a juvenile. Because the defendant was charged with
murder, one of the enumerated felonies in section 707(b)(1), a statutory
presumption of unfitness applied, shifting the burden to the defendant to
prove his fitness for juvenile treatment.
Prior to the fitness hearing, section 707(c) requires a probation officer
to evaluate and submit a report to the court on "the behavioral patterns
and social history'of the minor being considered for a determination of
unfitness." As part of his evaluation, the probation officer interviewed
the defendant in the presence of his attorney. Durng this interview, the
defendant made statements to the probation officer describing his background and the events surrounding the smuggling attempt. At the fitness
hearing, the court determined that Macias should be tried as an adult.
The defendant subsequently testified at his criminal trial, making several
statements that were inconsistent with his prior statements to the proba-

1. All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise indicated.

tion officer. The prosecution impeached the defendant's trial testimony,
using the inconsistent statements made to the probation officer during
the pre-hearing interview. The jury ultimately found the defendant guilty
of six counts of second degree murder and one count of operating a
motor vehicle without a valid license.
The court of appeal reversed the convictions, holding that the trial
court improperly permitted the prosecution to impeach the defendant's
trial testimony using the statements he made to the probation officer.
The appellate court relied on dictum from People v. May, 44 Cal. 3d 309,
317, 748 P.2d 307, 311-12, 243 Cal. Rptr. 369, 373-74 (1988), which interpreted the prior case of Ramona R. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 802,
810, 693 P.2d 789, 795, 210 Cal. Rptr. 204, 210 (1985), to hold that a
juvenile's statements made in connection with a fitness evaluation were
"legislatively compelled" and thus could not be used against a minor
defendant at a subsequent criminal trial "for any purpose." The California
Supreme Court granted review to clarify its decision in Ramona R. and
to consider "whether the prosecution may impeach a minor defendant at
a criminal trial with the inconsistent statements he made to a probation
officer who was evaluating him in preparation for a juvenile court fitness
hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(c)."
Holding. In Justice Chin's plurality opinion, the California Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeal's judgment and held that, contrary to
the dictum in May, "statements made in connection with juvenile fitness
hearings are not legislatively compelled, and, absent some demonstration
of involuntariness, they are admissible for the sole purpose of impeachment at the defendants' subsequent trials." The court observed that
Ramona R., which held that a minor's statements to her probation officer or during a juvenile fitness hearing may not be used substantively
against the minor in a subsequent trial, specifically left open the issue of
whether statements to a probation officer in preparation for a fitness
hearing could be used for the impeachment purposes.
The supreme court clarified the rationale of Ramona R., asserting that
the holding was not, as the dictum in May suggests, founded upon a
finding that the minor's statements in preparation for a juvenile fitness
hearing were legislatively compelled. On the contrary, "[s]ection 707(c)
does not require the minor to speak during the probation evaluation
period, and indeed provides the minor with alternatives during the evaluation process for producing any mitigating evidence that would rebut
the [un]fitness presumption." The court further explained that Ramona
R.'s grant of substantive use immunity was based on the need to protect
a minor's privilege against self-incrimination by eliminating the constitutionaliy impermissible cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt faced by a minor during the juvenile certification process. The Cal-
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ifornia Constitution does not, however, preclude the use of such statements for impeachment when a minor voluntarily testifies inconsistently
at trial.
The plurality further distinguished the instant case from New Jersey v.
Portash,440 U.S. 450, 458-59, 99 S. Ct. 1292, 1296-97, 59 L.Ed.2d 501, 50910 (1979), which held that involuntary or coerced statements made during a defendant's grand jury testimony could not be used for any purpose
at the defendant's subsequent trial. Here, the minor defendant's statements during the pre-hearing evaluation period were not compelled, and
thus, Portashdoes not preclude the admission of such statements for the
purpose of impeachment. This conclusion is also consistent with United
States Supreme Court and California Courts of Appeal decisions allowing
the limited use of voluntary statements made in other contexts for impeachment, even though such statements are otherwise substantively
inadmissible. Chief Justice George and Justice Werdegar concurred in the
opinion of the court.
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Baxter argued that because
the plurality concluded that statements to a probation officer in preparation for a juvenile fitness hearing were not compelled and thus, not obtained in violation of the privilege against self-incrimination, it follows
that they are admissible for any purpose and not just for impeachment.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Mosk argued that the rationale of
Ramona R. precludes the use of the defendant's statements for impeachment. Contrary to the assertion of the plurality, Justice Mosk argued that Ramona R. was premised on the "unanimous conclusion that
the statements made by a juvenile in connection with a fitness hearing
are not voluntary." Consequently, Justice Mosk asserted that although
not specifically addressed in Ramona R., it necessarily follows that such
involuntary statements are inadmissible for any purpose, including impeachment.

REFERENCES
Constitutional Provisions:
U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself .... ").

CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15 (state constitutional provision securing the right
against self-incrimination).
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d) (Right to Truth in Evidence provision, popularly referred to as Proposition 8) ("[Rlelevant evidence shall not be
excluded in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction motions and hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a
criminal offense, whether heard in juvenile or adult court.... Nothing in
this section shall affect any existing statutory rule of evidence relating
the privilege. . .

Statutes:
CAL. EVID. CODE § 940 (West 1995) (providing that "To the extent that
such privilege exists under the Constitution of the United States or the
State of California, a person has a privilege to refuse to disclose any
matter that may tend to incriminate him.").
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West 1984) (subjecting minors under the
age of eighteen to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for violation of
criminal laws).
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707 (West 1984) (requiring a fitness hearing,
upon petition for adult prosecution, to determine whether a minor fourteen years of age or older is amenable to the "care, treatment, and training program available through the facilities of the juvenile court").

Case Law:
New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 458-59, 99 S. Ct. 1292, 1296-97, 59
L.Ed.2d 501, 509-10 (1979) (holding that the defendant's involuntary
grand jury testimony could not be used to impeach his credibility at trial).
People v. May, 44 Cal. 3d 309, 317, 748 P.2d 307, 311-12, 243 Cal. Rptr.
369, 373-74 (1988) (holding that following passage of the Right to Truth
in Evidence amendments to the California Constitution, prior inconsistent statements elicited in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), could be used to impeach the defendant).
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Ramona R. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 802, 810, 693 P.2d 789, 795, 210
Cal. Rptr. 204, 210 (1985) (holding that "a minor's statements made to a
probation officer in preparation for a fitness hearing [may] not be used
as substantive evidence against the minor at a subsequent trial.").
People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 892, 533 P.2d 1024, 1044, 120 Cal.
Rptr. 384, 404 (1975) (concluding that use immunity for statements made
during the probation revocation hearing did not extend to impeachment
once the probationer voluntarily took the stand).
Bryan v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 575, 587, 498 P.2d 1079, 1087, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 831, 839 (1972) (holding, prior to passage of Proposition 8, that a
juvenile has substantive use immunity for statements made to a probation officer and the court in a juvenile fitness hearing).
Sheila 0. v. Superior Court, 125 Cal. App. 3d 812, 817, 178 Cal. Rptr. 418,
420 (1981) (holding that "testimony given by the juvenile at the fitness
hearing is inadmissible at the jurisdictional hearing except for the purpose of impeachment.").
Legal Texts:
27 CAL. JUR. 3D Delinquent and Dependant Children §§ 122-136 (1987 &
Supp. 1997) (addressing a minor's fitness for treatment under juvenile
court law).
10 B.E. WIWIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Parent and Child §§ 754774 (9th ed. 1989) (discussing the juvenile fitness hearing).
GENNARO F. Vrro & DEBORAH G. WILSON, THE AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE
SYSTEM (1985) (providing an overview of the juvenile justice system).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Martha E. Bellinger, Waving Goodbye to Waiver for Serious Juvenile
Offenders: A Proposal to Revamp California'sFitness Statute, 11 J. Juv.
L. 1 (1990) (proposing a complete renovation of the fitness statute to
give minors who commit serious offenses greater accountability).

Elizabeth W. Browne, Guidelinefor Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal
Court, 4 PEPP. L. REV. 479 (1977) (generally 'discussing the transfer of
juveniles to adult court).
Richard A. Gadbois, Jr. & Kenneth A. Black, 1976 Amendments to the
Juvenile Court Law: Adult Treatment of 16-17 Year-Old Offenders, 9 U.
WEST L.A. L. REV. 13 (1977) (focusing on the section 707 fitness hearings).
James R. McCall, Truth in Evidence and the Privilege Clause-A Compromised Relationship, 23 PAC. L.J. 1061 (1992) (discussing the Right to
Truth in Evidence amendments to the California Constitution, popularly
referred to as Proposition 8).
David Parker, Juveniles in Criminal Courts: Substantive View of the
Fitness Decision, 23 UCLA L. REV. 988 (1976) (criticizing the decision to
transfer youthful offenders to the adult correctional system).
Joseph N. Sorrentino & Gary K. Olsen, Certification of Juveniles to
Adult Court, 4 PEPP. L. REV. 497 (1977) (providing a general overview of
juvenile certification statutes).
Note, California Supreme Court Holds that Statements Made During
Juvenile Transfer Hearing May Be Used For Impeachment--California
v. Macias, 111 HARV. L. REV. 837, 840 (1998) (arguing that Macias was
wrongly decided because it "failed to preserve the protection against selfincrimination, to prevent manipulative police practices during transfer
evaluations, and to clarify doctrinal tensions.").

SHANNON MASON
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B.

An accomplice who aids and abets a robbery
only after the principal, acting alone, commits a
killing during the robbery is not guilty of first
degree murder under Penal Code section 189. A
trial court's failure to instruct the jury on that
principle is not reversible error, however, where
other parts of the verdict demonstrate that the
jury necessarily found the defendant guilty of
first degree murder on a proper theory.
People v. Pulido, Supreme Court of California, Decided May 29, 1997, 15 Cal. 4th 713, 936 P.2d
1235, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 625.

Facts. The defendant Michael Robert Pulido was prosecuted for robbery
and first degree murder arising from his participation in the robbery of a
gas station during which the attendant was killed. At trial, the defendant
testified that another person killed the attendant, and that he joined the
robbery as an aider and abettor only after the victim was ldlled. Conflicting evidence indicated, however, that the defendant was the actual killer.
The jury convicted the defendant of robbery and first degree murder, and
found true a robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation. Based on
this verdict, the trial court sentenced the defendant to life in prison with
no possibility of parole, pursuant to Penal Code section 190.2.
Relying on People v. Esquivel, 28 Cal. App. 4th 1386, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d
324 (1994), the defendant appealed the first degree murder conviction on
the ground that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that, under Penal
Code section 189 (the "felony-murder rule"), the defendant was not liable
for the murder if he formed the intent to aid and abet the robbery only
after the victim was killed. The court of appeal affirmed the murder
conviction and sentence, reasoning that because the defendant intentionally assisted in the asportation phase of the robbery, he was guilty of
robbery and thus, also guilty of first degree murder under section 189 for
any killing that occurred during the robbery, regardless of when the
defendant formed the intent to aid and abet the robbery. The California
Supreme Court granted review to resolve the conflict between the appellate court's broad interpretation of section 189 and the more limited
Esquivel interpretation.

Holding. The supreme court unanimously affirmed the judgment of the
court of appeal, but rejected the lower court's interpretation of Penal
Code section 189. Under the section 189 felony-murder rule, a murder
committed during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of one of
the enumerated felonies, including robbery, constitutes first degree murder. Contrary to the court of appeal, the California Supreme Court held
that an aider and abettor who joins a robbery after the killing has been
completed is not guilty of first degree murder under section 189 because
the killer was not then acting in pursuit of any common design or purpose with the accomplice. The court observed that its "cases establishing
the complicity of a nonkiller in a felony murder have... uniformly required, at a minimum, that the accomplice have been, at the time of the
killing, a conspirator or alder and abettor in the felony." Furthermore,
the supreme court declined to extend section 189's first degree felonymurder rule to killings committed before the alder and abettor joined the
felonious enterprise, noting that punishing aiders and abettors for earlier
homicides committed by others will not serve section 189's primary purpose of deterring felons from killing negligently or accidentally in the
commission of the underlying felony.
Affirming the murder conviction and sentence, the supreme court further held that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury that "a felony
murder verdict could be based on an aiding and abetting theory only if
[the defendant] aided and abetted the robbery before the infliction of the
fatal wound" did not constitute reversible error. In this case, the jury
received an instruction that the robbery-murder special-circumstance
allegation could not be found true unless the defendant was engaged in
the robbery at the time of the killing. By its special-circumstance verdict,
the jury explicitly found that the defendant's involvement in the robbery,
whether as a principal or as an aider and abettor, preceded the killing of
the victim. Thus, because the jury necessarily resolved the omitted factual issue adversely to the defendant, no prejudicial harm arose from the
trial court's failure to specially instruct. In reaching this conclusion, it
was unnecessary for the supreme court to determine whether the trial
court had a sua sponte duty to instruct on the nonliability of late joining
accomplices.
Turning its attention to the standard jury instructions related to this
issue, the supreme court observed that the combination of CALJIC No.
8.27 (first degree felony-murder aider and abettor instruction) and
CAJIC No. 9.40.1 (timing of intent to aid and abet robbery) could incorrectly suggest that "a person who aids and abets only in the asportation phase of robbery, after the killing is complete, is nonetheless
guilty of first degree murder under the felony-murder rule." Accordingly,
the court noted that modification or qualification of these instructions is
appropriate in cases where the evidence suggests that the defendant
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aided and abetted the perpetrator of the felony only after the victim was
fatally wounded.
REFERENCES
Statutes:
CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1997) (defining murder as the "unlawful
killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought").
CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West Supp. 1998) ("All murder... which is
committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate... [certain
enumerated felonies, including] robbery... is murder of the first degree.").
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(17)(A) (West Supp. 1998) (the "special circumstances" charge) (providing that the penalty for a defendant convicted of first degree robbery-murder is death or life imprisonment with no
possibility of parole).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 211 (West 1988) (defining robbery as "the felonious
taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person
or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of
force or fear").
Case Law:
People v. Asher, 273 Cal. App. 2d 876, 890 & n.2, 78 Cal. Rptr. 885 (1969)
(approving instruction that to convict accomplices of murder, jury must
find they "either conspired to rob or aided, abetted or participated in the
robbery prior to the time the fatal shot was fired").
People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d 1158, 1165, 811 P.2d 742, 282 Cal. Rptr. 450
(1991) (holding that a person commits robbery as an aider and abettor if
the person "form[s] the intent to facilitate or encourage commission of
the robbery prior to or during the carrying away of the loot to a place of
temporary safety").

People v. Esquivel, 28 Cal. App. 4th 1386, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 324 (1994)
(holding that a defendant who forms intent to aid and abet a robbery
after the victim has been fatally wounded cannot be found guilty of felony-murder).
People v. Martin, 12 Cal. 2d 466, 472, 85 P.2d 880 (1938) (liability for
murder extends to all persons "jointly engaged at the time of such killing
in the perpetration of or an attempt to perpetrate the crime of robbery").
People v. Sedeno, 10 Cal. 3d 703, 721, 518 P.2d 913, 112 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1974) (holding that the failure to instruct on a factual issue is not reversible error where "the factual question posed by the omitted instruction was necessarily resolved adversely to defendant under other,
properly given instructions"), overruled on other grounds, People v. Flannel, 25 Cal. 3d 668, 684 n.12, 603 P.2d 1, 160 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1979).
People v. Vasquez, 49 Cal. 560 (1875) (approving instruction on complicity of one robber for the murder committed by another robber when
done "in furtherance of their common purpose to rob").
People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 782, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442
(1965) ("All persons aiding and abetting the commission of a robbery are
guilty of first degree murder when one of them kills while acting in furtherance of the common design.").
Legal Texts:
17 CAL JUR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 207-215, 230 (1984 & Supp. 1997) (discussing the felony-murder rule in general).
17 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 223-224 (1984 & Supp. 1997) (specifically addressing the liability of accomplices for killing committed by a
co-felon).
1 B.E. WITIUN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Crimes
Against The Person §§ 470485 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the felony-murder doctrine).

3 B.E. WrrTIN & NORMAL L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAw, Punishment for Crime §§ 1569, 1582-1587 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1997) (discussing the special-circumstances allegation in general and as it relates to
felony-murder).
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Law Review and Journal Articles:
George P. Fletcher, Reflections on Felony-Murder, 12 Sw. U. L.REv. 413
(1980-81) (criticizing the felony-murder doctrine).
Barry B. Klopfer, The CaliforniaSupreme CourtAssaults Felony-Murder
Rule, 22 STAN. L.REv. 1059 (1970) (discussing the supreme court's criticism and limitation of the felony-murder rule).
Perkins, The Act of One Conspirator,26 HASTINGS L.J. 337, 344-45 (1974)
(explaining that the imposition of retroactive liability on a conspirator is
not a criminal-law doctrine).
Paul H. Robinson, Imputed CriminalLiability, 93 YALE L.J. 609, 618 n.25
(1984) (discussing the complicity aspect of the felony-murder rule).

SHANNON MASON

C.

Where a picture of victims at a crime scene is
sought to be introduced at trial, the photograph
may be relevant to corroborate witness testimony, to show premeditation of a crime, and, under
a felony-murder theory, to show that a murder
occurred. Further, where the photograph is not
overly gruesome, it will likely not be considered
unduly prejudicial.
People v. Scheid, Supreme Court of California, Decided July 17, 1997, 16 Cal. 4th 1, 939 P.2d 748, 65
Cal. Rptr. 2d 348.

Facts. The defendant contacted Kazumi Hanano (Hanano) about a Corvette Hanano had advertised for sale. After going to Hanano's residence
and test-driving the car, the defendant later returned with her boyfriend
and another man. While her boyfriend was purchasing the car, the defendant left Hanano's home. Her boyfriend and his partner then
handcuffed Hanano and his wife, ordered them to kneel in their bedroom, and pulled a mattress over their heads. Her boyfriend then shot
Hanano and his wife several times, paralyzing Hanano and killing his
wife. He then took Hanano's wallet and drove away in the Corvette.
At trial, the defendant's boyfriend and his partner were convicted of
murder, attempted murder, robbery, and burglary. The defendant was
charged with the same offenses. At pretrial, the defense moved to exclude a photograph of the victims taken at the crime scene which depicted their hands cuffed together and their heads laying on the bloody
mattress. The defense agreed to stipulate that the boyfriend committed
first-degree murder.
The trial court found that the photograph was not overly gruesome,
and that the probative value of the photograph far exceeded any prejudice that would result from its admission. Thereafter, the jury convicted
the defendant of one count of first-degree murder, one count of burglary,
and two counts of robbery. The court of appeal reversed the judgment,
finding that the trial court erroneously allowed the photograph into evidence because it was irrelevant and prejudicial.
Holding. Reversing the decision of the court of appeal, the California
Supreme Court held that the photograph of the victims was admissible.
The court focused on both the relevancy and prejudicial effect of the
photograph, as well as the Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 299 P.2d 243 (1956),
standard for harmless error in reaching its decision.
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The court held that the photograph was relevant to the case for three
reasons. First, the photograph corroborated the testimony of Hanano and
his son given both on the witness stand and to police during the investigation, thus bolstering the witnesses' credibility. Second, the photograph
offered proof that a murder actually occurred. The fact that the prosecution presented the theory of felony-murder did not preclude the need to
show that a murder actually occurred in the progress of the underlying
crime. Finally, the photograph depicted the victims handcuffed, suggesting that the perpetrators planned the robbery. The fact that they brought
handcuffs to the scene illustrated their intent to incapacitate the victims
while the robbery was carried out. The court also stated that the
defense's offer to stipulate as to the way in which the murder occurred
did not negate the photograph's relevance.
The court further held that the probative value of the photograph was
not outweighed by the potential prejudice it may have invoked upon the
defendant. The photograph was probative of the deliberation with which
the robbery and murder were consummated. Further, little prejudice
would result from the photograph because "although the photograph
[was] unpleasant, it [was] not unduly gory or inflammatory." Because the
photograph was taken from a distance, it did not graphically detail morbid wounds. Additionally, the victims were face down, thus hiding any
contorted facial expressions. Further, the jury knew that the defendant
was not present at the time of the murder, and this knowledge decreased
any prejudicial effect the photograph may have caused.
Finally, the court noted that even if the trial court erred in admitting
the photograph, the error would have been harmless under the Watson
standard. Under this standard, erroneously admitting a photograph will
only result in reversal if "it is reasonably probable the jury would have
reached a different result had the photograph been excluded." In the
case at bar, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to support the
defendant's conviction, even in the absence of the only photograph.
Moreover, the photograph depicted images related in graphic witness
testimony, and the prosecution presented only one photograph, on which
it spent little time.

REFERENCES

Statutes:
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d) (stating that relevant evidence shall not be
excluded from criminal proceedings).
CAL. EVID. CODE § 210 (West 1995) (defining relevant evidence).

CAL. EVID. CODE § 350 (West 1995) (stating that only relevant evidence is
admissible).
CAL. EVID. CODE § 351 (West 1995) ("Except as other provided by statute,
all relevant evidence is admissible.").
CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1995) (stating when courts may exclude
evidence).
Case Law:
People v. Hines, 15 Cal. 4th 997, 938 P.2d 388, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594 (1997)
(holding that use of photographs of victims was harmless error in light of
the strength of the prosecution's other evidence pointing to the
defendant's guilt).
People v. Bradford, 14 Cal. 4th 1005, 929 P.2d 544, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 225
(1997) (permitting photographs in a first degree murder capital case).
People v. Jackson, 13 Cal. 4th 1164, 920 P.2d 1254, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 49
(1996) (affirming the trial court's admission of three post mortem photographs of the victim).
People v. Lucas, 12 Cal. 4th 415, 907 P.2d 373, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 525 (1995)
(stating that an express evaluation of prejudice is not required to admit
photographs of a victim).
People v. Memro, 11 Cal. 4th 786, 905 P.2d 1305, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 219
(1995) (stating that the court enjoys broad discretion in admitting photographs of a victim).
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People v. Medina, 11 Cal. 4th 694, 906 P.2d 2, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 165 (1995)
(allowing photograph of the defendant to be used during the guilt phase
for identification purposes).
People v. Cain, 10 Cal. 4th 1, 892 P.2d 1224, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 481 (1995)
(allowing photographs of the victims where they were not unduly gruesome or inherently inflammatory).
People v. Garceau, 6 Cal. 4th 140, 862 P.2d 664, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 664
(1993) (finding no abuse of discretion in admitting photographs of the
victims' bodies).
People v. Price, 1 Cal. 4th 324, 821 P.2d 610, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 106 (1991)
(stating that photographs of victims are not cumulative where used to
assist the jury in understanding and evaluating the testimony).

Legal Texts:
21 CAL. JuR. 3D Criminal Law § 3136 (Supp. 1997) (discussing demonstrative evidence generally).
31 CAL. JuR. 3D Evidence § 399 (1976) (discussing trial court discretion to
admit photographic evidence).
2 B.E. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE § 834 (3d ed. & Supp. 1986) (discussing admissibility and relevance of demonstrative evidence).
2 B.E. WITgIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE § 837 (3d ed. & Supp. 1997) (discussing admissibility of photographic evidence of victims despite some prejudicial effect).
2 B.E. WIrKN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE § 839 (3d ed. & Supp. 1997) (discussing admissibility of photographic evidence generally).

Law Review and Journal Articles:
Sean W. Baker, Evidence, 56 MD. L. REV. 849 (1997) (discussing admissibility of photographs of victims during life).
Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 48 MERCER L. REV. 323, 324-26 (1996) (discussing relevance of photograph of defendant taken at time of arrest).
Amy S. Thomas, Note, Utah Rule of Evidence 403 and Gruesome Photographs: Is a Picture Worth Anything in Utah?, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 1131
(1996) (discussing admissibility of graphic evidence under the Utah Rules
of Evidence).

LEALLEN FROST
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III. Healing Arts and Institutions
The statutory "reasonable licensee defense" set
forth in section 1424 of the Health and Safety
Code does not negate or repeal the common law
doctrine of nondelegable duties for licensees, and
allows long-term health care facility licensees that
have received citations for violations of patient
care laws to rebut a presumption of negligence by
showing that both the licensee and its agents acted reasonably under the circumstances.
CaliforniaAss'n of Health Facilitiesv. Department of
Health Servs., Supreme Court of California, Decided
Aug. 7, 1997, 16 Cal. 4th 284, 940 P.2d 323, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 872.
Facts. The plaintiff, an association representing various licensees of
long-term health care facilities, filed an action for declaratory relief
against the Department of Health Services (the Department), the agency
charged with enforcement of patient care laws and regulations under the
Long-Term Care, Health, Safety, and Security Act of 1973 (the Act). Under the Act, the Department has authority to inspect facilities and issue
citations to licensees for violations of state and federal regulations governing long-term health care facilities. Such citations may include civil
monetary penalties. In this action, the plaintiff sought an interpretation
of the "reasonable licensee defense" set forth in section 1424 of the
Health and Safety Code, which requires dismissal of a citation if the
licensee proves that it "did what might reasonably be expected of a longterm health care facility licensee, acting under similar circumstances, to
comply with the regulation."
The plaintiff asserted that section 1424 relieves a licensee of vicarious
liability for the actions of its employees as long as the licensee itself
acted reasonably. The trial court agreed and granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, declaring that a licensee is not vicariously
liable for the unreasonable actions of its employees if three specific conditions are satisfied. After modifying the judgment to eliminate the conditions, the court of appeal affirmed the trial court's conclusion that, in
applying the section 1424 reasonableness defense, the department cannot
hold the licensee vicariously liable for the misconduct of its employees.

The California Supreme Court granted review to interpret the reasonable
licensee defense set forth in section 1424.
Holding. In a unanimous decision, the supreme court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal, holding that the reasonable licensee defense
set forth in section 1424 does not negate a licensee's vicarious liability
for the misconduct of its employees. The court first recognized that section 1424 is remedial in nature and should be liberally construed in favor
of the nursing care patients it is intended to protect. Furthermore, following the general rule that "[u]nless expressly provided, statutes should
not be interpreted to alter [or conflict with] the common law," the court
must construe section 1424 consistently with the settled common law
doctrine of nondelegable duties of licensees. This doctrine holds a licensee responsible for the conduct of its agents in order to ensure that the
license is exercised in compliance with the law and to prevent "future
harm to the public by giving the licensees strong incentives to ensure
that their employees' conduct conforms to the law."
The court then examined the language of the statute to determine
whether the legislature intended to repeal the common law rule of nondelegable duties of licensees. First, the court noted that section 1424's
reasonable licensee defense is modeled after section 669(b) of the Code
of Evidence, under which a showing of reasonableness will rebut a presumption of negligence per se. Second, the court determined that the
legislature must have intended the reasonable licensee defense to be
interpreted consistently with the judicial construction of section 669(b),
which has not been construed to repeal the principle of nondelegable
duty or respondeat superior liability. Thus, the supreme court concluded
that section 1424 imposes nondelegable duties upon long-term health
care facility licensees and that the licensee will be held liable for its
agents failure to perform such duties in accordance with the law. The
reasonable licensee defense requires dismissal of a citation only when
the licensee can prove that, both it and its agents acted reasonably under
the circumstances, despite the existence of a violation.
REFERENCES
Statutes:
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §

1424(b) (West Supp. 1998) (providing that

a citation shall be dismissed if the licensee proves that it "did what might
reasonably be expected of a long-term health care facility licensee, acting
under similar circumstances, to comply with the regulation.")
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CAL. EVID. CODE § 669(b) (West 1995) (providing thatthe presumption of
negligence per se for violation of a statute, ordinance or regulation of a
public entity may be rebutted by proving the violator acted reasonably
under the circumstances).

Case Law:,
People ex rel. Lungren v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 4th 294, 313-314, 926
P.2d 1042, 1054-55, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855, 868-69 (1996) (holding that a
remedial statute should be liberally construed in favor of the class of
persons it is intended to protect).
Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem'l Hosp., 12 Cal. 4th 291, 306, 907
P.2d 358, 367, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 510, 519 (1995) (holding that a health care
provider was not vicariously liable in tort for an employee's sexual assault on a patient because the employee's actions occurred outside the
scope of employment).
Kizer v. County of San Mateo, 53 Cal. 3d 139, 142-43, 806 P.2d 1353, 135455, 279 Cal. Rptr. 318, 319-20 (1991) (summarizing the licensing enforcement regime under the Long Term Care, Health, Safety, and Security Act
of 1973).
Ford Dealers Ass'n v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 32 Cal. 3d 347, 360,
650 P.2d 328, 335, 185 Cal. Rptr. 453, 460 (1982) (explaining that under
the rule of nondelegable duties, the licensee must ensure that the license
is not used in violation of the law and thus, the licensee is responsible
for the conduct of its employees in the exercise of the license).
Maloney v. Rath, 69 Cal. 2d 442, 444-48, 445 P.2d 513, 514-17, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 897, 898-901 (1968) (interpreting an analogous reasonableness defense (later codified verbatim as Evidence Code section 669) to overcome a presumption of negligence per se and holding that the defense
does not negate the principle of nondelegable duties).
Goodman v. Zimmerman, 25 Cal. App. 4th 1667, 1676, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d
419, 424 (1994) (holding that statutes should be interpreted consistently
with common law rules, unless the legislature expressly provides otherwise).

Legal Texts:
29 CAL. JUR. 3D Employer and Employee §§ 91-124 (1986 & Supp. 1997)
(generally discussing the vicarious liability of an employer for the wrongs
of employees to third parties).
36 CAL. JuR. 3D Healing Arts and Institutions §§ 56-63, 67-76 (1997)
(discussing the regulation of long-term health care facilities and the enforcement provisions under the Long-Term Care, Health, Safety, and Security Act of 1973).
2 B.E. WrrIUN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Agency § 115 (9th ed. 1987
& Supp. 1997) (discussing the nature and theory of the respondeat superior doctrine).
6 B.E. WrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Torts §§ 818-20, 830-32 (9th
ed. 1988) (explaining the principle of negligence per se as codified in
Evidence Code section 669, its application to violations of statutes and
administrative regulations, and a violator's ability to rebut the presumption of negligence by proving he acted reasonably in spite of the violation).
6 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §§ 1017-18 (9th ed.
1988) (discussing the theory of nondelegable duties and a public
licensee's liability for the actions of independent contractors).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Review of Selected 1992 CaliforniaLegislation, 24 PAC. L.J. 919 (1993)
(explaining the 1992 amendments to the citation appeal process for nursing facilities).

SHANNON MASON
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IV. Juror Misconduct
When a juror is unable to render a verdict upon
the evidence presented, and instead reaches a
verdict based on extraneous information, which
creates a state of mind rendering a juror unable to
act with entire impartiality and without prejudice,
the juror has failed to act as a competent juror
under California law, and, therefore, a new trial
for the defendant must be granted.
People v. Nesler, Supreme Court of California,Decided
August 21, 1997, 16 Cal. 4th 561, 941 P.2d 87, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 454.
Facts. Following the guilt phase of a bifurcated trial, the defendant was
convicted of voluntary manslaughter for killing the man charged with
molesting her son. During a break in the sanity phase of the trial, one
juror obtained extraneous information regarding the defendant's
parenting skills and use of illegal drugs, which the juror shared with
fellow jurors during jury deliberations. At the' conclusion of their deliberations, the jury determined that the defendant was sane at the time of
the incident. Consequently, the defendant moved for a new trial based on
juror misconduct, arguing that the juror involved was biased and prejudiced during voir dire and that her comments to fellow jurors evidenced
an inability to act as an impartial juror throughout the deliberations.
The trial court refused to grant the defendant's motion for a new trial.
The court held that the juror was not biased and prejudiced during voir
dire because the extraneous information was received after voir dire.
Moreover, the court concluded that any questionable comments and
characterizations made by the juror during jury deliberations failed to
establish her actual bias because the comments could have reasonably
stemmed from the evidence presented at trial. The trial court further
reasoned that a new trial was unnecessary because the extraneous information was irrelevant to the issues presented to the jury for consideration.
The court of appeal, applying a two part test, affirmed the decision of
the trial court. The court of appeal first determined that there was suffi-,
cient evidence in the record to show that the questionable juror did not
conceal information during voir dire. Second, the court of appeal was

unconvinced that the juror was biased by the extraneous information,
and, therefore, concluded that any questionable comments and characterizations made by the juror during deliberations were the result of the
evidence presented at trial.
Holding. Reversing the court of appeal, the supreme court held that the
juror's actions indicated a "substantial likelihood of actual basis" during
the sanity phase of the trial, and as a result the defendant was entitled to
a new trial limited to the sanity issue. The court observed that a jury
verdict must be vacated for juror misconduct where it appears that there
is a substantial likelihood of actual juror bias. Based on the applicable
California law, the court defined actual bias as "the existence of a state
of mind on the part of the juror in reference to the case, or to any of the
parties which will prevent the juror from acting with entire impartiality,
and without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party."
The court demonstrated that such bias is shown in one of two situations; first, where extraneous information received by a juror is so prejudicial that it is sufficiently likely to influence a juror, and second, where
the information is not facially prejudicial, but the court has determined
that the juror was actually biased by the information. In determining
whether a juror is biased, the court stressed that when the extraneous
information is received is irrelevant. Instead, the court focused on the
questionable juror's state of mind and their ability to act impartially and
without prejudice.
The court conceded that the juror involved in the present case was not
guilty of blameworthy conduct, however, the court believed that the
nature of the juror's continued comments concerning the defendant evidenced her own actual bias. The juror's comments, including calling the
defendant a "crankster" (referring to the defendant's alleged drug use),
established that the juror had a particular state of mind which rendered
her unable to act with entire impartiality. Moreover, the court reasoned
that the juror's disclosure of the extraneous information to other jurors
evidenced a desire to influence the jury deliberations in accordance with
her own biased opinions of the defendant.
The court further held that the defendant was entitled to a new sanity
trial because the extraneous information involved did directly relate to
the issues presented to the jury during the original sanity phase of the
trial. In contrast to the court of appeal, the court was convinced that the
rumors concerning the defendant's drug use were central to the
defendant's argument that she experienced a temporary psychosis on the
day of the murder due to her past drug use, and was, therefore, not sane
during the incident. Thus, the court was of the opinion that the extraneous information most likely influenced the jury's evaluation of material
elements of the trial.

[Vol. 25: 685, 1997]

CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

REFERENCES
Statutes:
CAL. CONST., art. I, § 16 (requiring that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to a trial by an unbiased and impartial jury).
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 225 (West Supp. 1998) (dictating that a jury verdict should stand unless the irregularity of the questioned information
goes to the merits of the trial or works to influence any of the jurors).
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 227 (West Supp. 1998) (articulating that during
voir dire a challenge for cause may be exercised against an individual
juror for actual or implied bias).
CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 1150 (West Supp. 1995) (stating that when a verdict is challenged, evidence may received concerning the statements,
conduct, or events which occurred either in or outside the jury room
that may have influenced the verdict).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1181 (West Supp. 1998) (allowing for a new trial
when the jury has received any extraneous evidence).

Case Law:
People v. Holloway, 50 Cal. 3d 1098 (1990) (holding that a criminal conviction cannot stand where a single juror has been improperly influenced).
In re Carpenter, 9 Cal. 4th 634 (1995) (declaring that the appellate court
alone has the power to review charges of juror misconduct, not the trial
court).
In re Hitchings, 6 Cal. 4th 97 (1993) (holding that it is misconduct for a
juror to receive extraneous information concerning the pending case).

Legal Texts:
50A C.J.S. Juries § 462 (1997) (defining a defendant's right to a fair trial
to include the right to have potential jurors "sworn and examined as to
their qualifications").
50A C.J.S. Juries § 463 (1997) (showing that the purpose of voir dire is
to determine whether potential jurors are qualified, competent and can
act impartially).
23A C.J.S. CriminalLaw § 1410 (1995) (stating that where there is an
unambiguous jury verdict, it is not necessary to look to the jury's intent.
Where, however, the jury renders an ambiguous verdict, the court must
construe the verdict considering the evidence presented at trial and the
entire record).
23A C.J.S. CriminalLaw § 1415 (1995) (defining the scope of a court's
investigation into a charge of juror misconduct as limited, and appropriate only in situations of extraordinary circumstances and where there is
a preliminary showing of a need to investigate).
89 C.J.S. Trials § 523 (1955) (stating that jurors cannot impeach their
own verdicts, but affidavits of jurors may be used to show the verdict
received by the court does not embody the true finding of the jury).
59 CAL. JuR.

3D

Trials § 52 (1980 & Supp. 1997) (discussing that juries

must be guarded against improper influences).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Paul Jeffery Wallin, To Impeach or Not to Impeach: The Stability of Juror Verdicts in Federal Courts, 4 PEPP. L. REV. (1977)(discussing the
federal rule prohibitions on juror impeachment).

MAIm SANFORD
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V. Statute of Limitations
When a plaintiff, suing for medical malpractice
under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform
Act, serves a defendant with the required ninety
day notice of intent to sue prior to the expiration
of the original three year statute of limitations,
the notice serves to toll the original statute of
limitations for ninety days.
Russell v. Stanford University Hospital, Supreme
Court of California,Decided June 5, 1997, 15 Cal. 4th
783, 937 P.2d 640, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97.
Facts. The plaintiff, two years after receiving surgical treatment from the
defendants, a hospital and a physician, alleged that the defendants negligently performed medical treatment on her hand, causing it to become
disfigured and unusable. The plaintiff served the defendants with a notice
of her intent to sue, as required by the Medical Injury Compensation
Reform Act, fifty-one days prior to the expiration of the original three
year statute of limitations.
Following the expiration of the required ninety day notice period, and
thirty-nine days after the running of the original statute of limitations, the
plaintiff filed a complaint in the superior court alleging medical malpractice. The trial court, bound by Rewald v. San Pedro PeninsulaHospital,
27 Cal. App. 4th 480, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 411 (1994), refused to interpret
California Code of Civil Procedure section 364 as tolling the original
three year statute of limitations set forth in California Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5, and granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment, reasoning that the plaintiffs action was not timely. The court
of appeal reversed, refusing to follow Rewald, which held that section
364 did not toll the three year statute of limitations.
Holding. Affirming the decision of the court of appeal, the California
Supreme Court held that when the required notice of an intent to sue for
medical malpractice is served prior to the running of the original three
year statue of limitations and pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 364, the original statute of limitations is tolled for ninety
days. The court reasoned that interpreting section 364 as tolling the original statute of limitations advanced the legislative purpose of the statute.

The court examined the statutory history which revealed that the purpose of the legislation was to encourage negotiation between the parties
in an attempt to reduce the burdensome costs of medical malpractice
litigation. The court further noted that the legislative purpose is evidenced by the current amended statute which provides for a ninety day
notice of an intent to sue to facilitate a period of negotiation.
The court then discussed why tolling the original statute of limitations
did not unfairly prejudice a defendant in a medical malpractice suit. The
court pointed out that tolling the statute of limitations equally benefits
both parties. The court explained that the notice itself serves to inform
defendants of the pending action and provides them an opportunity to
negotiate and compile information to avoid costly and burdensome formal litigation.
The court also considered the usual statutory rule that where two
statutes are in conflict, the most recent statutory provision controls.
Here, the court pointed out that section 364 was the most recent statutory provision; therefore, its tolling provision controlled the three year
statute of limitations provided under section 340.5.
Thus, the court held that even though the plaintiff filed her complaint
after the expiration of the original statute of limitations, she was nevertheless within the guidelines of section 364, and was therefore timely.
REFERENCES
Statutes:

§ 340 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998) (defining the beginning of the statute of limitations as the time when the patient discovers the injury).
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 364 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998) (setting forth the
legislation generally; including the legislative intent for requiring the
injured party to serve a ninety day notice of intention to sue, limitations
of the notice, tolling, and the effect of failing to comply with this provision).

Case Law:
Woods v. Young, 53 Cal. 3d 315, 807 P.2d 455, 79 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1991)
(holding that California Code of Civil Procedure section 364 tolls the one
year statute of limitations under MIRCA).
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Noble v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. App. 3d 1189, 237 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1987)
(limiting the tolling provisions of California Code of Civil Procedure
section 364 to negligence cases, not intentional torts).
Hilburger v. Madsen, 177 Cal. App. 3d 45, 222 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1986).(discussing the tolling effect of California Code of Civil Procedure section 364).
Legal Texts:
26 A.L.R. 5th 245 (1995) (examining equal protection challenges to
MIRCA).
61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers §§ 316-325
(1981 & Supp. 1997) (explaining the general limitations on a medical malpractice claim).
61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 372 (1981)
(discussing modem approaches to medical malpractice claims).
36 CAL. JUR. 3D Healing Arts & Institutions § 347 (1997 & Supp. 1997)
(defining the limitations of California Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5).
36 CAL. JuR. 3D Healing Arts & Institutions § 350 (1997 & Supp. 1997)
(discussing the tolling of the statute of limitations under MIRCA).
5 B.E. WrrIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Torts §§ 778-779 (9th ed.
1987 & Supp. 1997) (considering the nature and purpose of MIRCA as
well as its constitutionality).
5 B.E. WrrIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Torts § 786 (9th ed. 1987 &
Supp. 1997) (explaining the notice of intent to sue requirement under
California Code of Civil Procedure section 364).

Law Review and Journal Articles:
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